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Should Directors Reduce
Executive Pay?
by
RANDALL S. THOMAS*

Introduction
America is rapidly becoming a two-tiered society. Over the past
two decades, the gap between worker and executive pay and the size
of societal income inequalities have increased rapidly.' Companies
have made large awards of potentially lucrative stock options to
corporate executives and highly skilled workers, whereas at the lower
levels of the job ladder, compensation has risen much more slowly
While the starkness of these trends was masked by rapid economic
growth in the late 1990s, those at the top end of the pay scale received
a disproportionate share of this new wealth.
After years of lurking in the wings, the collapse of the Enron
Corporation and the ensuing corporate governance crisis, coupled
with the current economic recession, have thrust these internal
corporate pay disparities onto the center stage of American life.
Congressional hearings on the vast differences in the way that Enron
Corporation treated its top executives and all other workers have
filled the media with shocking stories that have outraged many

* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. I would like to thank
Jennifer Hill for her comments on a draft of this paper, and Katherine Knight Schultz and
Dong-Wuk Yuk for their research assistance in this project.
1. See, e.g., PAUL RYSCAVAGE, INCOME INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS

OF TRENDS (1999); Daniel H. Weinberg, A Brief Look at Postwar U.S. Income Inequality,
in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 1 P60-191 (1996); see

also Constance Mitchell Ford & Patrick Barta, Income Gap Broadens Amid Boom, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2000, at A2 (low-income workers' salary gains are tiny compared with the
enormous gains of professional workers in high tech and other industries). But see Jon E.
Hilsenrath, Income Gap Narrowed at End of '90s, WALL ST. J., April 24, 2002, at A2
(reporting some narrowing of income gap, although "[fqew doubt that the gap between
rich and poor has widened substantially during the past 30 years").
2. Patrick Barta, Rises in Many SalariesBarely Keep Pace with Inflation, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2000, at A2.
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citizens The fate of that company's unemployed white and blue
collar laborers, whose 401(k) plans and pensions evaporated with

their company's collapse, compared to that of Enron's executives,
who sold its stock before the market collapsed and whose pensions

escaped the company's slide into bankruptcy, offered a vivid
illustration of the difference in how corporations treat powerful
managers compared to the rest of their employees.
Corporate boards have been barraged with criticism for these
differences. While labor groups, including the AFL-CIO, have for
years attempted to pressure corporate boards to reduce executive and
white collar workers' pay arguing that the large gaps between worker
and manager pay are inequitable,' the current scandals have shaken
things up far more. This proxy season, shareholder activist groups
have launched repeated attacks on corporate pay practices, claiming

that increased levels of wage inequality are harmful to society.5
Should corporate directors respond to these claims? Do executive

pay practices harm their firms and implicate boards' fiduciary duties
to maximize firm value?
This Article argues that wide gaps between the top and bottom
of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, directly and adversely
affect firm value. It further contends that corporate boards should be
informed about these effects and in many cases they should reduce
internal pay differentials to address them. In support of this thesis,
this Article analyzes numerous empirical studies illustrating that wide
disparities in corporate pay scales can adversely affect firm value.
3. See generally N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002 (containing over a dozen stories about the
Enron collapse and its effects, including several on its implications for executive pay
practices). See also Jennifer Hill & Charles M. Yablon, Corporate Governance and
Executive Remuneration: Rediscovering ManagerialPositionalConflict, 25 U. New S.
Wales L.J. 1 (2002) (executive compensation is a corporate governance problem arising
out of managerial conflicts of interest).
4. The AFL-CIO's web site provides its perspective on why current executive pay
practices have led to this pay gap. Executive PayWatch, at http://www.aflcio.org/
paywatch. Executive PayWatch allows individuals to compare their own salaries with
those of corporate executives of ninety-six firms. The site also provides information on
how shareholders can decipher proxy statements and use their proxies and the
shareholder-proposal mechanism to encourage change. Id.
5. Nigel Cope, Big Investors Attempt to Derail the Boardroom Gravy Train,
INDEPENDENT (London), May 10, 2002, at P24, available at 2002 WL 20195248. One
particularly active group has been United for a Fair Economy's Responsible Wealth
Project. Their website, http://www.responsiblewealth.org, details concern about the
dangers of excessive income inequality and their efforts to change executive pay practices
to address those problems. They have been frequent sponsors of shareholder resolutions
designed to attack wage gaps between CEOs and workers in the 1999-2000 proxy season.
Id.
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Specifically, these studies demonstrate that in many organizations, as
internal pay differentials grow, employees and lower level managers
increasingly perceive their compensation as unfair in comparison to
more highly paid top management. This perception adversely affects
employee performance, productivity and willingness to work, and
thereby reduces firm value. Therefore, directors' duty of care should
require that they consider the spread between the high and low end of
the corporate pay scale when setting firm compensation levels and act
in the corporation's best interests to reduce it if necessary to
maximize firm value.
This Article goes on to demonstrate that an important cause of
growing pay differentials are mega-grant stock option awards.6
Corporate directors are uninformed about the real costs and benefits
of these expensive grants.' Mega-grants of stock options to corporate
managers are unjustified if their uncertain benefits are exceeded by
their high costs. As virtually no research has shown that the benefits
of these grants exceed their cost, directors have no evidence that
these programs maximize firm value. Once again, directors' duty of
care should obligate them to be informed about the net benefits of
these grants because it constitutes material information that both
directly and indirectly affects the value of their firm.
Section I of this Article examines internal pay differentials and
the impact of CEO compensation contracts on them. It begins with a
discussion of the size of these differentials and economists' theories
about executive pay, including the justifications for "pay-forperformance" contracts, whereby CEOs receive large blocks of
options to buy their company's stock. This section then analyzes the
stock option components of current CEO pay contracts and identifies
them as a significant cause of the rapid expansion in internal pay
differentials at most American corporations.
Section II considers the existing empirical research into the
effects of internal pay differentials and stock option awards on firm
value. Research documents that large disparities in compensation
between managers and workers can lower firm value. Little work has
been done to determine if mega-grants of stock options to executives
6. A mega-grant of stock options is an award with an initial value of more than $10
million. Id. at 35. Over 50% of the CEOs of Fortune 200 companies received such grants
in 2000. Id.
7. Shareholders have reacted to these high costs with steadily increasing opposition
to stock option plans in recent years. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The
Determinantsof ShareholderVoting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31,
33 (2000).
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increase firm value. This Article concludes with the argument that
directors' duty of care should require them to be better informed
about the effect of internal pay differentials and the value of stock
option awards, and in certain circumstances to lessen pay
differentials.
I. Corporate (Executive) Pay Inequalities
A. Internal Pay Inequalities Are Growing

At most American corporations, the gap between the highest and
lowest paid employees has widened enormously over the past thirty
years. For example, in 1970, the average CEO at an S&P 500
company made roughly thirty times more than a production worker.8
By 1996, this gap had widened to 210 times the average earnings of a
production worker.9
The magnitude of these pay differentials can be further
illustrated by comparing executive pay increases with the growth in
pay for other workers. From 1982 to 1994, the average CEO's pay
increased 175%, or approximately 8.8% per year.0 If total wealth
increases are measured by including the change in the value of stock
options, average CEO wealth increased by 269.7% during that twelve
year period, or 11.5% annually. By contrast, the rate of increase for
average compensation for all workers during that same time period
was only 0.6% a year." State and local government workers' pay did
slightly better, averaging 0.9% per annum.12 Only Major League
Baseball players and National Basketball Association players
achieved annual increases similar in size to those of CEOs. 3 The gap
between executive and worker pay increases continued to widen in

8. Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR
ECONOMics 2485, 2553 (0. Ashenfelter & D. Card eds., 1999) (comparing the gains that
executives realize from exercising stock options). As I discuss in the section below, these
differentials may have negative effects on employee morale and productivity. Further
fueling worker anger is the fact that corporate layoffs frequently lead to stock price
increases, especially in industries with excess capacity. Workers thus perceive that the
value of executive stock options increases when they lose their jobs. Id.
9. Id.
10. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,
113 Q. J. ECON. 653, 665 (1998).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. As Hall and Liebman note, however, "these very high growth rates in sports
leagues are distorted by complicated changes in rules governing free agency and salary
caps." Id.
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2000. The average compensation for all other workers went up only
4.5% in 2000, the highest increase in the last five years, while CEO
pay increased 8.2%.'
International comparisons also illustrate disparities in U.S.
compensation. American executive compensation is many times that
of comparable executives in Europe and Japan.15 The pay gap
between CEOs and line workers is also many times greater in the
U.S. than elsewhere. At large Japanese firms, the average CEO earns
only seventeen times more than the average worker. CEOs at
German and French firms make about twenty-four times more than
the average worker at those firms. 6 By contrast, over the same time
period, American CEOs' pay averaged 109 times that of their
company's workers.17
Stock option compensation is the principal cause of these
differences. 8 The widening gap between American CEOs' pay and
that of the average workers at their firms arises out of the marked
increase in the long-term compensation elements of CEO pay
packages. 9 Similarly, when we compare American CEOs' pay with
foreign CEOs' pay, the biggest difference between them is that

14. Joann S. Lublin, Hedging Their Bets, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,2001, at R4.
15. See Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Regulation and the Globalization
(Americanization) of Executive Pay, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS
(forthcoming 2003) for an extensive discussion of the international pay gap for CEOs. See
also Murphy, supra note 8, at 2496 (noting that American executives are paid more than
twice that of executives in other countries). U.S. executives get a higher fraction of their
pay in stock options, and less in salaries, than their counterparts in other countries. Id.
However, at least one commentator views the fact that American executives make more
than their foreign counterparts as a reason why the American economy is so strong. Ira T.
Kay, High CEO Pay Helps the U.S. Economy Thrive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1998, at A22.
"It turns out that high CEO pay-provided it is linked to performance-is a crucial factor
making the U.S. economy the most competitive in the world." Id.
16. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION &
MANAGEMENT 425-36 (1992).
17. One partial explanation for these differences may be that American executives are
not given lifetime employment contracts, as Japanese executives often are. Furthermore,
U.S. companies face a much higher risk of a hostile takeover than companies in other
countries. Id. This makes U.S. executives' job tenure even less secure. Greater pay
packages may be necessary in order to compensate American managers for the greater
employment risks that they bear.
18. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 866 (2002) (explaining that
the increase in CEO pay in the 1990s primarily reflects a dramatic growth in stock
options).
19. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 427.
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American companies make much greater use of stock options. 20 The
pay differences between American and foreign companies are limited
to CEO pay; existing data show no significant differences in pay for
lower level employees.'
B.

Economists' Theories of Executive Pay and Pay Differentials
Corporate boards routinely negotiate compensation agreements
with CEOs and other top management. These contracts are designed
both to reward executives for their efforts on the company's behalf
and to encourage them to continue to work hard in the future.
Economists have devoted a lot of attention to understanding the
market for corporate executives and to the appropriate design of
executive compensation contracts.

20. Cheffins & Thomas, supra note 15; Murphy, supra note 8, at 2497. The higher
levels of risk assumed by American CEOs, who do not have lifetime employment
guarantees and therefore bear more of the risks associated with unsuccessful projects they
initiate, could explain why incentive pay is prevalent in the U.S. and nonexistent in other
countries. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 431; see also EDWARD P. LAZEAR,
PERSONNEL ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 236 (1998) (stating that promotions may
depend on more random factors in U.S. than Japan and therefore require a wider spread
in compensation structure in order to create adequate incentives).
21. Murphy, supranote 8, at 2497 (summarizing studies).
22. Business and Economics literature has been generous in its analysis of executive
compensation and the problems of designing and implementing appropriate contracts. See
George P. Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593
(1988); Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The
Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1992, at 28; John E.
Garen, Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1175
(1994); Brian J. Hall, A Better Way to Pay CEOs?, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
SHAREHOLDER VALUE 35 (Jennifer Carpenter & David Yermack eds., 1999); Joseph G.
Haubrich, Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem, 102 J. POL.
ECON. 258 (1994); Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, Implicit Contracts and the
Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance, 31 RAND J.
ECON. 273 (2003); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen
Boards of Directorsand Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1998); Bill
Gross, The New Math of Ownership, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 68; Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, PerformancePay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 225 (1990) [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy, Performance Pay]; Michael C. Jensen &
Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS.
REV., May-June 1990, at 138 [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy, CEO Incentives]; David I.
Levine, Fairness,Markets, and Ability to Pay: Evidence from Compensation Executives, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 1241 (1993); Wilbur Lewellen et al., Executive Compensation and
Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis, 9 J. ACCr. & ECON. 287 (1987);
Brian G. M. Main et al., Top Executive Pay: Tournament or Teamwork?, 11 J. LAB.
ECON. 606 (1993); Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get,
HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125 [hereinafter Murphy, Top Executives]; Charles
A. O'Reilly III et al., CEO Compensationas Tournament and Social Comparison: A Tale
of Two Theories, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 257 (1988); Uma V. Sridharan, CEO Influence and
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In neo-classical economic analysis, well-functioning labor
markets have informed active buyers and sellers. In the market for
corporate executives, the corporation, acting through a compensation
committee of its board of directors, is the buyer of management
services.23 The compensation committee negotiates with the sellers of
management services, the executives or potential executives of the

corporation, over the terms of their pay packages. The value of the
compensation ultimately paid can be thought of as the price for
executive services.

In the standard neo-classical economic model, arm's length
negotiations between an informed buyer and an informed seller lead
to a competitive price prevailing in the market." The firm hires
additional labor up to the point that the cost of an additional worker,
the wage rate, equals the additional revenue that the worker brings
into the firm.25 This model presumes that workers are quick to
change jobs to take advantage of differentials in wages or benefits,
and that firms rapidly adjust their employment levels as demand for
their product changes. The model further predicts that workers and
companies will engage in only limited investments in developing their
human capital.26

Executive Compensation, 31 FIN. REV. 51 (1996); James Wade et al., Golden Parachutes:
CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 587 (1990); Charles A.
O'Reilly et al., Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Equity and Executive
Compensation (1996) (Stanford Univ., unpublished working paper) (on file with author)
[hereinafter O'Reilly, Overpaid].
23. Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the
Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231,235 (1983).
24. In a perfectly competitive market, there are a large number of sellers of a uniform
product, a large number of consumers of the product, low barriers to entry, and perfect
information about market conditions. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 55
(1978). When these conditions prevail, then a profit maximizing firm will set the price of
its goods equal to its marginal revenue which will also be equal to its marginal cost. Id.
25. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 327; DEREK BOK, THE COST OF
TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS
AMERICA 14-15 (1993).
26. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 328. Human capital is defined as the

"knowledge and acquired skills a person has that increase his or her ability to conduct
activities with economic value." Id. This term is further refined into two categories: firmspecific capital, which has value only to the particular firm where the worker is employed;
and general purpose capital, which increases the worker's productivity at several different
employers. Id.
In the neo-classical model, employers will have no incentive to invest in developing
workers general purpose capital, only in their firm-specific capital. Id. Workers, on the
other hand, will be interested in improving their general purpose capital, but not their
firm-specific skills. Id. As a result, the model predicts that there will be little investment
in human capital. Id.
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Most modern labor markets do not function in this manner. In
most sectors neither companies nor workers change employment as
frequently as the neo-classical model predicts.27 Both groups invest in
training programs that would have little value if the neoclassical
model was accurate.28 Furthermore, the notion that executives are
being paid an amount equal to the marginal product of their labor
sheds little light on the current levels of executive compensation.29
The neoclassical model's poor explanatory value has led economists
to develop alternative models of the labor market.

Modern labor economics begins with the recognition that most
employment

relationships are long-term, incomplete, relational

contracts, involving important implicit elements and assigning most
authority to the employer.0 These contracts are relational contracts,
in that they set forth only the general terms of the relationship
between the parties and some mechanisms for resolving unforeseen
contingencies. The parties' written contract is supplemented by
unwritten, self-enforcing understandings referred to as implicit
contracts." While most middle level managers are employed through
these implicit contracts, top executives increasingly negotiate formal
contracts.32

Internal corporate labor markets are based on long-term,

incomplete, relational contracts.33 In these markets, workers are hired

27. Id. at 329. There may be some spot labor markets where wages are set on a daily
or hourly basis based on supply and demand in which the neo-classical model of labor
markets may be an accurate description. See id. However, such markets are the
exception.
28. Id.
29. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 3.
30. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 329. These features are a function of the
difficulty of foreseeing and describing future events, and the costs of negotiating explicit
terms of an employment agreement if these contingencies could be determined with any
certainty.
31. Id. at 332. Compare Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in
Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan
J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (stating that a corporation is a nexus of contracts, many of which
are implicit ones that the corporation must be trusted to honor).
32. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2491. These contracts typically last a period of five years,
specifying "minimum base salaries, target bonus payments (with or without guarantees),
and severance arrangements in the event of separation or change in corporate control."
Id. For an analysis of the legal components of these contracts, see Stewart J. Schwab &
Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEOs Bargain For?: An Empirical Analysis of Key Legal
Components of CEO Contracts (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Working Paper 2002) (on file
with author).
33. An internal labor market is defined as consisting of "an employer and (some
particular group of) its long-term employees. There may be more than one internal labor
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by the corporation at entry level positions and stay with the same
employer for many years.34 Their career path relies on promotions
inside the company." These internal labor markets interact only to a
limited degree with the larger external labor market.36
Promotions within an internal labor market have been
analogized to tournaments: the best performers in the workplace are
At each level of the
promoted to the next level of jobs."
organizational job ladder, workers are competing with other workers
for a fixed number of spots in an elimination tournament.38 The
market within a single firm, each involving different groups of workers." MILGROM &
ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 359.
34. Long-term employment relationships are efficient ways of organizing internal
labor markets for several reasons: first, they encourage the formation of firm-specific
human capital; second, they permit the use of implicit, relational contracts in which
promises of fair treatment and loyalty are enforced by internal mechanism and
reputational considerations; and third, they allow for monitoring of employee
performance over longer periods of time to evaluate their contributions to the firm. Id. at
363.
35. Pay levels within an internal labor market may be relatively insulated from
external market forces. Id. at 360. Firms will, however, need to compete to attract
workers at the entry level, and may need to hire senior people from outside the firm at
market rates. Id.
36. Id. at 359 (noting that few workers from outside the firm compete with those in
internal market for advancement within the firm).
37. The analogy is to single elimination sports tournaments, such as tennis
tournaments. LAZEAR, supra note 20, at 225. The best player wins the match and
receives the prize associated with being the winner. Id. In this context, relative
performance is the key. Id.
Firm internal labor markets are claimed to be like these sports tournaments in several
ways. Id. First, the participants in most internal labor markets are restricted to persons
already working for the firm in the position just below the one with an opening. Id.
Second, workers are promoted because they are relatively better than the other workers in
their current position. Id. Third, workers are claimed to try harder to obtain the
promotion based on the spread between their current compensation and the compensation
for workers at the next level, that is the spread in pay. Id. at 225-26. However, if there
are other factors that affect a worker's chances of being promoted, such as luck, or
variables outside of their control, this will reduce worker's incentives to work harder and
require larger wage gaps between positions to induce the same level of increased worker
effort. Id. at 235. For an extensive discussion of tournament theory as an explanation for
corporate pay scales, see id. at 223-52.
Tournament theory has also been applied in models of law firm promotion of
associate lawyers. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 77-120 (1991). For a recent
critique of this application, see David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the
Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor
Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1998).
38. Tournaments have several advantages as a method of allocating promotions: first,
they require only ordinal information about the relative capabilities of the contestants for
the jobs, which is generally reasonably available at a relatively low cost; second, looking at
relative performance eliminates the common elements of uncertainty that may affect the
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winner of the tournament receives the immediate prize of a better job
with higher pay and benefits, plus the valuable chance to compete for
a job at the next level.39 The value of this "option" to compete later
for higher positions gives additional incentives to the players in the
lower rounds."
As the winners progress up the job ladder, there are fewer higher
levels to attain. For each winner, this reduces the value of their
option to compete for future jobs. In order to maintain the incentives
to compete, an employer must therefore increase the direct financial
gains from obtaining a promotion as individuals rise in the hierarchy.4'
This means that the increase in pay must increase as an individual
reaches higher managerial levels. This is especially true for the pay
gap between the CEO and the level of executives directly below that
position, because there are no further competitions for the CEO to
win.' 42 In fact, empirical studies have demonstrated that pay
differentials increase between ranks as workers climb corporate job
ladders, with the promotion to CEO resulting in an extraordinary
jump in pay."
Tournament theory offers a potential explanation for large
disparities between the salaries paid to middle managers and workers
on the one hand, and CEOs on the other.44 Competitors are
incentivized by the high spread in the potential payoffs to seek the
higher positions. This is claimed to lead to greater productivity and a
more efficient organization. "5
Tournament theory may also explain why the gap between lower
and upper level employees increased so rapidly in recent years. The
performance of all of the applicants; and third, they reduce the incentives that employers
may have to act opportunistically in reneging on performance payments. LAZEAR, supra
note 20, at 243-45; MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 368-69.
Some other fundamental characteristics of economic tournament theory include: that
the quality of the work performed by the workers is hard to monitor; and that firms
nevertheless succeed in providing incentives that stimulate employees to work hard.
Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1591-92; see also O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at
6.
39. LAZEAR, supra note 20, at 240; MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 376;
O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 6.
40. LAZEAR, supra note 20, at 240. Of course, some players may choose not to
compete. To the extent that numerous workers elect this option, the validity of this
assumption of tournament theory must be called into question. Wilkins & Gulati, supra
note 37, at 1606-07.
41. LAZEAR, supra note 20, at 240; MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 376.
42. LAZEAR, supra note 20, at 240.
43. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 376.
44. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 3.
45. Id. at 6
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restructuring of American business beginning in the late 1980s
resulted in the downsizing of many levels of middle managers.
Tournament theory predicts that reducing the number of levels of
potential promotions will lower the incentives workers have to strive
for advancement, unless there are offsetting increases in the pay
associated with higher level jobs."' Raising CEO salaries increases the
ultimate prize that a manager can win through promotions and thus
offsets the disincentives of having fewer intermediate advancement
steps.47
Such tournaments are criticized for ignoring the negative effects
on those that do not advance and obtain the prizes.
In settings
where cooperation is more valuable than competition, tournaments
can create ill will and mistrust that hurt productivity. "In this sense,
tournament theory is based on the assumption that competition
encourages increased effort but ignores the effects of competition
when performance results from cooperation among interdependent
participants. 49 In other words, firms holding tournaments wind up
full of "losers" in the management ranks below the CEO. 0
A related concern is that managers may be able to increase their
chances of advancing to higher positions through political maneuvers
and acts of sabotage rather than on their merits." This undermines
the efficiency arguments in favor of a tournament style pay structure
and supports a more compressed wage structure in the upper levels of
organizations. As discussed in section III below, more equitable pay
systems may be preferable.

46. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 428.
47. Tournament theory also suggests an explanation for why incentive pay is the
largest component of CEO compensation. Once you reach the top of the pyramid, there is
no where else to advance. Id. Any financial incentives thus must come from being paid
for performance. Id. Thus, as is observed, explicit performance pay should become most
important to those at the top of the organization. Id.
48. Id.
49. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 7; Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1614
(noting that "[a] firm structured entirely as a tournament would not be an environment
that fostered cooperation simply because one's success in the standard tournament is a
direct function of others not performing as well").
50. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 7.
51. Id.; see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 37, at 1614 (noting potential for sabotage
in competitive setting; also pointing out that those determining who advances in the firm
may not judge candidates solely on their merits but also on whether they perceive them to
be threats).
52. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 7.
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In any type of pay system, incentive pay can motivate workers to
put forth their best efforts.53 These incentives can be explicit ones,
where the employees' contracts link pay with measures of individual
productivity or performance. Alternatively, an employer may use
implicit incentive pay with no simple link between individual
performance and pay. 4 Implicit incentive pay schemes are much
more prevalent than explicit ones because of the difficulties in

specifying advance performance goals and in adequately measuring
performance after the fact. However, these difficulties may be
overcome where there is a good proxy for the desired performance
goal.5
CEO pay is one situation where an adequate proxy for individual
performance may be available. While it would be impossible to try to
enumerate all of the potential scenarios that a CEO will have to deal
with, most shareholders would agree that the company's stock price

would serve as a reasonable measure of the overall performance of
the company's top officer.56

If this measure is accepted, then an

explicit compensation contract could be based on the company's
stock price performance. 7
Stock options and other explicit incentive compensation
instruments became an increasingly important part of executive pay
packages.58 They were frequently justified on the grounds that they

represented "pay-for-performance," that is, they base an executive's
53. Compensation policies can have a variety of other, sometimes competing, goals.
MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 390. Some potential goals include attracting and
retaining quality employees with the organization, signaling the values that the company
values, and helping employees decide how to allocate their time. Id.
54. Id. at 402. In these situations, there may be subjective or poorly articulated criteria
for pay raises and promotions. Id. They have incentive aspects to them, though: "[alt a
minimum, those who perform especially badly may be fired, and in most situations this is a
spur to attempting to perform acceptably." Id.
55. Id. at 402-03.
56. Of course, stock price performance is not just a function of CEO effort. There are
many other factors that influence a firm's stock performance, such as the economic
condition of the countries or industries that use its product or from which it buys its inputs.
This "noise" in the company's performance places certain risks on managers. Sarah A.B.
Teslik et al., Executive Compensation, in 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 153, 165 (Harvey L. Pitt et al. eds., 1993) This is an unavoidable cost of
pay-for-performance plans. Id. See infra notes 15-18 for further discussion of the
interaction of risk and incentive pay.
57. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 403. See infra section B for a discussion
of some of the problems associated with the use of stock prices as a measure of CEO
performance.
58. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L J. 59, 64 (1992) (arguing that "[s]tock option plans
are the fastest-growing component of compensation packages.").
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remuneration on her company's increase in value."

Performance

based compensation became widely accepted in the corporate world
in the 1990s, 6° although critics claimed that the amounts awarded were
excessive."
Boards of directors responded to requests for increased pay for

performance by awarding mega-grants of stock options to many top
executives. These grants sharply increased the size of top executive
ownership of company stock and options. In all, executives (and
other employees) in 1998 held an average 12.7% of the stock in large
American companies on fully diluted basis, a substantially greater
percentage of their company's stock than they did ten years ago.62
Over the past year, the disadvantages of option compensation
have become more apparent, leading to an increasingly heated debate
about its value. As noted above, pay-for-performance is said to
stimulate managers to work harder to increase their company's value
by giving them a share of any gains that they helped to create. While
this remains true today, more attention is being paid to the question
of how much of the additional wealth created should be allocated to
managers, and what portion to stockholders.63 Furthermore, since

1998, firms that introduced unexpectedly highly dilutive stock option
plans have suffered stock price declines.6'

59. Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 301, 306 (1995) (stating that stock options have been
approved by Congress as performance-based compensation). In theory, boards could use
changes in salary and bonuses to incentivize managers to perform better. However, under
current conditions, it seems very unlikely that this will occur. Hall, supra note 22, at 13.
Political pressures will prevent boards from awarding huge bonus payments that are likely
to attract criticism from the media and shareholders, whereas friendly boards are unlikely
to be willing to cut executive pay sharply when things go poorly. Id.
60. See Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in
Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 148 (1995) (noting the "near
total lack of resistance" to the notion of performance-based compensation).
61. See section II infra for further discussion of this point.
62. IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center) estimates that the average
potential dilution resulting from existing stock option plans is approximately 12.7% in
1998, a more than one percentage point increase from 1997. DREw HAMBLY &
ALESANDRA MONACO, POTENTIAL DILUTION 1998, at 1 (1999); see also Murphy, supra
note 8, at 2534. A decline in the size of executive share holdings has been more than offset
by an increase in their option holdings. Id. at 2534-35.
63. Thomas & Martin, supra note 7, at 59-60.
64. KENNETH J. MARTIN & RANDALL S. THOMAS, WHEN IS ENOUGH, ENOUGH?:
MARKET REACTION TO HIGHLY DILUTIVE STOCK OPTION PLANS AND THE
SUBSEQUENT IMPACT ON CEO COMPENSATION 27 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law School, Law
& Econ., Working Paper 02-06, 2002).

HeinOnline -- 54 Hastings L.J. 449 2002-2003

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54

Another oft-cited virtue of stock options is that they can align
the incentives of managers and shareholders to maximize firm value.65
In widely held public corporations, this alignment function is an
important corporate governance tool for reducing management
agency costs. However, the recent downturn in the stock market has
highlighted a problem with options as an alignment mechanism:
stock options have little downside risk for executives holding them,
and therefore once their exercise price drops below the market value,
the managers holding them have no incentive to limit corporate
losses. In other words, executive stock option holders' incentives are
identical to shareholders' incentives when the stock price is
increasing, but diverge dramatically from them once the stock price
starts falling.
This divergence of interests in falling markets also appears when
we consider the difference in views between shareholders and
executive stock option holders with respect to downside risk. Stock
options were originally promoted as a means of inducing risk averse
managers to act more like shareholders.6 Managers are risk averse
because their jobs and salaries are at risk if the corporation becomes
insolvent. 6 The value of their salaries are fixed, and relatively
invariant if the firm's fortunes fluctuate substantially. However, a
manager's value in the labor market could decline if her company
takes risks and they do not pay off. 68

Thus, it was claimed that

managers were too risk averse in their corporate decision making
because they have little to gain if the company does well and much to
lose if it does poorly.
Stock options give managers incentives to undertake more risky,
high return projects because the expected value of stock options rises
with the volatility of the underlying stock's price.69 Managers that
65. LAZEAR, supra note 20, at 122; Hall, supra note 22, at 4; see also Murphy, supra
note 8, at 17 (noting that "[s]tock options provide a direct link between managerial
rewards and share-price appreciation").
66. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2510 n.29.
67. In other words, managers are undiversified because their human capital and
financial capital are invested largely in their own company. For this reason, and the fact
that they are often restricted in their exercise or sale of the options, company executives
will place a lower value on stock options than other investors would. Id. at 2510. These
effects will be mitigated or offset by managers' access to superior information about the
company's future prospects which may allow them to time their exercise of their options.
Id.
68. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 430.
69. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Ross L. Watts, The Investment Opportunity Set and
Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies, 32 J. Fin. Econ. 263, 275
(1992).
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receive option grants therefore have incentives to undertake business
projects that increase the volatility of the company's asset values.7"
But these incentives are asymmetric. Executives holding large
quantities of stock options have incentives to take big chances to
drive their companies' stock price up to increase the value of their
options. If these big risks pay off in a temporary stock price run up,
executives can cash out their options, and make millions of dollars in
profits. Furthermore, if executives see that their gambles are not
paying off, they may also try to hide this from investors by "cooking
the books" or other dishonest practices.
If the big gambles do not pay off, then the executives' stock
options value can only drop to zero, even if the stock price falls far
below the options' strike price. So executives have incentives to
worry about upside risks, but to undervalue downside risks."
Shareholders care about both types of risks, although they may
feel differently about systematic risks, those endemic in the entire
system, and unsystematic risks, those that are particular to a single
company. Undiversified stockholders worry about both (company
specific) unsystematic risks and systematic risks.72 They value
company specific upside and downside risks when they are investing
in a company, as well as systematic risks from a variety of sources
including, the economy or the failings of our corporate governance
system.73 Diversified shareholders, by holding a portfolio of stocks
from different companies, can eliminate the risk that one company's
performance will have too dramatic an effect on their investments as
a whole.74 However, they cannot eliminate systematic risks that may
arise if all companies whose stock they hold exhibit the same
problems.
If executives at all companies hold stock options, and this leads
them to engage in excessively risky (or dishonest) behavior, then the
risk created can become a systematic one and all shareholders will
care. In other words, if stock options create a serious corporate
70. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2510 (citing studies).
71. Note that the executives will suffer other harms if the stock price drops far enough,
such as potential unemployment and loss in the value of their stock holdings.
72. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

FINANCE 153 (5th ed.
risk).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 153-54.
through diversification
shareholders who can
neutral. Id.

1996) (giving a general discussion of systematic and unsystematic
In finance terms, shareholders can eliminate firm-specific risk
strategies. Id. In large public corporations, with large numbers of
spread their risks widely, shareholders may be effectively risk
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governance problem, then they are a systematic risk. Even if such
practices only arise at some firms, the unsystematic risks created can
still impose enormous costs on investors and the economy."
Options may have other failings too. Stock options were
promoted at many companies because they were viewed as a
relatively cheap way to compensate executives for accounting
purposes. Under existing accounting rules, stock options can be
issued without charging anything against a company's earnings,76
whereas cash compensation must be deducted from earnings.

Particularly for start-up firms and high tech companies with little
cash, options were a preferred form of payment during the stock
market boom of the 1990s.
Today, under tremendous pressure from shareholders, most
notably Warren Buffett, this appears to be slowly changing. In 2002,

many companies have announced that they will charge the cost of
stock options against their earnings, and those that do not must face
increased questioning from analysts and others about their footnote
disclosures on these costs. International accounting standards have
also been changed to require companies to deduct the cost of stock

options, and the United States Congress has legislation before it that
would require companies to expense options. This may make the true
cost of options more apparent to both directors and investors.

75. Alan Beattie, CorporateScandals Will Cost the US $35 Billion, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2002, at 4 (estimating that the costs of the corporate governance crisis to the American
economy will exceed $35 billion).
76. See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, INC., APB OPINION 25:
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, 2 APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
6735, 6736-38 (1972). If the options have a predetermined exercise price and expiration
date, no cost is recognized by the company when the option is granted if it has no intrinsic
value (the spread between the market price and exercise price) at the time of the grant.
Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for
Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 35 (1997).
Most companies grant options with an exercise price at fair market value at the time of the
grant, so there is no accounting expense incurred. Id.
The subsequent tax consequences are calculated at the time of the exercise of the
option. If the stock options are non-qualified, then when they are exercised, the executive
realizes a taxable gain equal to the difference between the exercise price and the market
price at the time of the exercise. Id. The company can take a compensation expense
deduction for the same amount. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2514. For qualified, or
"Incentive Stock Options" ("ISOs"), the manager does not pay taxes at the time of
exercise, but rather at the eventual time of sale of the security (if the security is sold). Id.
The company cannot take a tax deduction for ISOs. Id.
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Options also create opportunities for corporate executives to
unfairly exploit their informational advantages over shareholders.77
Corporate insiders have access to better information about their
companies than outside shareholders. Insiders know when the firm is
about to announce important information, or the industry is about to
undergo material changes. Although the federal securities laws
prohibit insiders from trading on material information, there are
many ways in which insiders can do so with relative impunity."
Insiders' ability to exercise options provides them with a means to
capitalize on their informational advantage.
Finally, there has been a flurry of academic research indicating
that options are an expensive way to compensate executives
compared to cash. Several studies have shown that the cost to
companies of issuing options, as measured by the Black-Scholes
formula, far exceeds the value that executives attach to them.79 This
difference stems from the contingent nature of the option's value,
which leads executives to attach a lower certainty value to them.
Using stock options as a form of compensation only makes sense if
the difference between their cost to the company and their value to
the executive, say A C, is less than any additional value that options
create that is not created by cash compensation, say A V. The A V
may be comprised, for example, of any value that arises from better
alignment of shareholders' and managers' interests which, as noted
above, is uncertain.
All of these factors have led to new calls for reconsideration of
the use of stock option compensation, especially mega-grant awards.
As we will see in section II.B, directors may want to consider
alternative ways of aligning investor and manager incentives.
II. Large Internal Pay Differentials May Reduce Firm Value
In recent years, scholars have studied the connection between
the size of internal pay differentials and firm value. As discussed
below, they have found that large internal pay differences can lead to
reduced firm value. Where these differentials are caused by large
stock option grants, it is unclear if there are offsetting benefits.
77. Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize
Performance-BasedRemuneration: A Case of MisalignedIncentives, 35 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 83, 113-14 (2000).

78. Id.
79. BRIAN HALL & KEVIN J. MURPHY, STOCK OPTIONS FOR UNDIVERSIFIED
EXECUTIVES 11 (U.S.C. Marshall School of Business, Working Paper No. 01-16,2001).
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Corporate directors' fiduciary duties should require them to take into
account these effects on shareholder value.
A.

Internal Pay Differentials Affect Firm Value

Big executive pay-for-performance packages may have negative
effects on the efforts and productivity of lower paid members of the
firm. Numerous studies have shown that large disparities between
CEO pay and the pay of other managers and employees of the firm
80
adversely impact employee morale, productivity and turnover.
These effects have been studied using social comparison theory. This
theory rests on the observation that people compare themselves to
other people in a variety of ways.8' These social comparisons have
significant consequences on peoples' perceptions and actions. Within
an organization, social comparisons often lead to a belief that
inequities exist.82 Further studies directly link these feelings of
inequity to "lower productivity, a loss of group cohesion, theft, lower
quality, and increased turnover."83

80. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 4.
81. The seminal article was Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes,
7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954). Festinger claimed that people engage in self-evaluation of their
abilities and opinions by comparing themselves to other people who are similar in certain
ways. Id. at 121. He believed that these comparisons can help people's self-esteem and
egos about things they consider important. Id. at 119. Subsequent research has found this
to be true, and that these comparisons can also be used to further self-evaluations and
improvements. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 9-10 (summarizing research on these
questions.) O'Reilly concludes that "there is compelling evidence that individuals use
social comparisons to evaluate their own performance and abilities as well as to increase
self-esteem." Id. at 10. He further finds that,
[o]verall, the research on social comparison theory offers strong support for the
tendency for individuals in organizations to engage in upward social comparisons
with senior managers in order to understand how well they are doing, whether
their compensation package is fair, and how equitably they are being treated.
When making these comparisons, there is also evidence that people are more
sensitive to changes in their relative rather than absolute level of pay.
Id. at 11-12 (summarizing other studies).
82. Id. at 4-5. Equity theory, as proposed by Adams, argues that people engage in a
mental comparison between themselves and others about their respective inputs and
outcomes to make judgments about what is equitable. J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social
Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 272-96
(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965). When the ratios of inputs and outcomes are comparable,
then the outcomes are viewed as fair. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 12. Dissimilar
ratios create perceptions of unfairness and lead to tensions that must be addressed. Id.
O'Reilly observes that there are good reasons to expect that these perceptions will affect
corporations, including the facts that executive salaries are widely reported and that social
comparisons are likely to be made by other workers within the company. Id. at 13.
83. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 5.
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Researchers have used these insights to examine the effects of
managerial pay inequities within corporations on worker morale,
turnover and pay demands. Using cross-sectional, time-series data
from a sample of 120 firms over five years, Professor O'Reilly and his
colleagues found that larger pay gaps between corporate CEOs and
lower levels of managers were associated with higher rates of
managerial turnover. '
They concluded that "insofar as
underpayment is associated with turnover of senior managers, there
are potential costs to the shareholders from turbulence in the senior
[management] team...."85 In other words, big pay gaps can lead to
lower morale and higher turnover.
O'Reilly further found that CEO pay inequities affected entire
managerial pay scales, with over and underpayment of the CEO
associated with over and underpayment of employees at lower
organizational levels. 6 They interpret this finding as indicating that

there may be substantial additional costs to shareholders associated
with the overpayment of CEOs, while employees will bear the direct
costs of underpayment of CEOs.87 Shareholders will still indirectly

bear these latter costs because under compensation leads to higher
managerial turnover.
Several other studies have reached similar conclusions. For
example, Pfeffer and Langton studied the effects of wage inequality
on job satisfaction, worker productivity, and the ability to work
together, in a large sample of university and college faculty.' The
authors found that increased wage dispersion led to lower levels of
job satisfaction, collaboration, productivity, and recent research
output.89 The authors further found that when pay was tied to
performance, productivity increased, but both job satisfaction and
collaborative measures decreased. 9°
Pfeffer and Davis-Blake

84. Id. at 28-29.
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id. at 28.
87. Id. at 29.
88. Jeffery Pfeffer & Nancy Langton, The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction,
Productivity, and Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University Faculty,
38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 382 (1993).
89. Id. at 403. These authors discuss more detailed results of the relationship between
satisfaction and wage dispersion, at pp. 397-402; the relationship between collaboration
and wage dispersion at pp. 402-03; and the wage dispersions relationship to research
productivity and recent research output at pp. 394-97.
90. Id. at 403. The authors also found that individuals react better to larger wage
dispersion if the method of allocation was perceived to be fair. Id. at 400. They concluded
that if firms developed wage scales that were considered fair and legitimate by their
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conducted a similar study for college administrators, where they

examined the relationship between an individual's place in the
college's salary structure, the degree of wage dispersion in that
structure and turnover rates among administrators.9 '
They
determined that an individual's position in the salary structure and
the level of dispersion in that structure jointly affect turnover.92 They
concluded that organizations should weigh the positive effects of big
wage differentials on upper level employees against their negative
effects on the lower levels. 93

Finally, Professors Bloom and Michel's study of the effects of
pay dispersion among managers at large publicly traded corporations

reaches very similar conclusions.94 Using data from two managerial
compensation studies, they found that increased levels of pay
dispersion in corporate salary structures led to lower levels of job
tenure and increased turnover among managers.9

Additionally, they

found that these effects were "robust across different samples, at
different periods of time, at different managerial levels and after
accounting for external labor market effects." 96 They concluded that

pay dispersion is of "strategic importance" for corporate decision
makers.97

employees, such as basing salaries on seniority or performance, most employees would see
these allocations as equitable and not react as negatively to wage dispersion. Id. at 397.
91. Jeffery Pfeffer & Allison Davis-Blake, Salary Dispersion, Location in the Salary
Distribution,and Turnover Among College Administrators, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
753 (1992).
92. Id. at 762. Thus, a high degree of salary dispersion negatively affects turnover of
high earners, but increases effects turnover of low earners. Id. The authors also found
that lower earners react negatively to a high salary dispersion regardless of the differences
in skill, experience, nature of their position, and education. Id.
93. Id. The authors go on to state that organizations must be careful about engaging
in too much wage compression because they may lose some of their highqst valued
performers. Id. Which effect predominates may depend on the type of business that the
firm is engaged in. In other words, high degrees of wage dispersion may be value
maximizing where the firm's production processes do not depend on team production
efforts, but rather on the efforts of a few top performers.
94. Matt Bloom & John G. Michel, The Relationships Among Organizational
Context, Pay Dispersion, and Managerial Turnover (Univ. of Notre Dame Department of
Management, unpublished working paper, 2000) (on file with author).
95. Id. at 14.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing S. FINKELSTEIN & D. HAMBRICK, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: TOP
EXECUTIVES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONS (West 1996) and B. Gerhart &
G.T. Milkovich, Employee Compensation: Research and Theory, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 481-569 (M.D. Dunnette & L.M.
Hough eds., 2d ed. 1992).
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Bloom and Michel's second important finding was that
organizational context makes a difference.98 Companies that have
particular needs for star managers, such as those experiencing highly
uncertain environments, may need to offer them higher pay. The
result is higher levels of pay dispersion, which in turn causes greater
managerial turnover." Other firms may want to preserve a more
collegial, team-oriented atmosphere, preferring low levels of pay
dispersion thereby reducing management turnover levels. Bloom and
Michel found that companies with high levels of investment
opportunities have more dispersed pay structures and higher turnover
levels.1"
These studies have significant implications for corporate pay
structures. If executive pay is set using a tournament process, these
results cast doubt on the efficiency of tournaments as a method of
selecting executives at many companies. Sequential elimination
tournaments rely upon ever increasing awards to the winners, which
may have perverse consequences for firm value if the losers perceive
they are being unfairly rewarded compared to the winners.
Tournament losers may leave the firm if the wage gap is too big,
resulting in a decline in firm value if the losing managers have
valuable, firm-specific human capital. Their retention and future
contributions may depend heavily on how they perceive themselves in
comparison with their fellow managers. An organization that
encourages inequities internally, thereby leading these individuals
(and their valuable firm-specific human capital) to look elsewhere
may be inefficient. Directors will need to consider their firm's
particular needs and determine whether a more dispersed pay
structure maximizes shareholder value.
On the one hand, firms that are heavily dependent on keeping a
few star employees happy may need to have highly dispersed salary
structures. On the other hand, at many companies, a better model of
how top management works may be to look at each manager as a
member of an interdependent team of workers. The success of this
team depends on how they work together. Explicit competition may
98. Id. at 4. They discuss several other studies about pay dispersion that have been
conducted of the auto racing industry, professional golfers, baseball teams, and others. Id.
The findings of these studies support the idea that context is very important: more
dispersed pay structures will be beneficial in some settings and harmful in others. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 6. "[D]ispersed pay structures promote the survival and retention of star (i.e.
the most talented) managers, but at the cost of increasing workforce instability and
turnover among remaining managers." Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 15.
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be detrimental to the high level of teamwork and cooperation that is
necessary for peak performance. 0 Research on teamwork and the
promotion of cohesive groups indicates that equity and equality are
very important."02 Compensation systems that create big money gaps
between the pay levels of upper and lower level managers create the
wrong incentives and promote divisiveness and turnover rather than
cooperation and longevity among team members.
Instead,
compensation systems may be better designed to insure effective
teamwork if they stress equality and not competition.' 3
Even outside of the top tiers of management, pay equality is
important. Workers and middle management, who face heavy
demands to work long hours and make sacrifices for the corporation,
are well aware of the huge and increasing gap between their pay and
that of the few at the top."

Directors need to determine if large pay gaps between top
managers and other workers adversely affect productivity, turnover,
and ultimately the value of the firm. The board should know at what
compensation level these effects begin and if they increase at higher
levels. For example, boards should know: How big should internal
pay gaps be to maximize firm value? What is the appropriate
multiple of executive pay to what a line worker or lower level
manager makes? Even if we establish a standard, will it need to
change over time and as compensation levels increase? These
important questions cannot be answered without further research."'
B.

The Uncertain Value of Large Stock Option Grants

Internal pay disparities between top management and other
employees are due to a variety of factors, but one of the main culprits
are mega-grants of stock options. Directors routinely award CEOs
and other top executives large blocks of stock options as part of their
compensation packages. In doing so, they focus on the benefits of
101. As discussed in section I.B., one of the negative consequences of tournaments as a
method of determining executive advancement is that political maneuvering and sabotage
may become the preferred methods to achieve a higher position, rather than merit-based
selection. These tactics rarely lead to increases in firm value.
102. O'Reilly, Overpaid, supra note 22, at 31 (summarizing studies).
103. Id.
104. The AFL-CIO has even set up a web site on the internet, Executive PayWatch, to
allow anyone to compare their salaries with those of corporate executives at a large
number of firms. Executive PayWatch website, at http://www.aflcio.org/paywatch.
105. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2554. "Understanding the effects of pay inequities in
organizations.., seems a natural direction for future research in executive
compensation." Id.
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such grants and whether this form of pay gives CEOs the correct
incentives to maximize firm value.1"" Several studies have shown that
there is a positive correlation between the use of incentive pay and
firm performance."' High CEO incentive pay has been justified on
the grounds that CEOs have a huge effect on the value of their
company and should be given strong reasons to increase that value.1 O
The issue that originally generated the most interest in the
economics literature was whether the existing levels of incentive pay
were high enough. Some economists have argued that, at present,
CEO incentive pay is too weakly tied to corporate performance to
There are two
bring about optimal increases in firm value."
arguments that support their position."' The first argument rests on
the idea of efficient capital markets. In the semi-strong form of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis, all publicly available information
is claimed to be incorporated into a company's stock price through
the research and trading behavior of sophisticated analysts and
investors."1 If these investors view the adoption of incentive plans as
increasing firm value, then they will bid up the price of the firm's
stock accordingly."' Thus, if the stock market views the adoption of

106. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 433. Distributional considerations, such
as how shareholders and managers split up the wealth that is created, are irrelevant from
an efficiency perspective. Id. Economic theory has little to say about the appropriate
distribution of wealth. Dollars in the hands of shareholders are valued the same as dollars
in the hands of corporate executives. In other words, how much corporate executives are
paid is just a transfer payment that does not affect efficiency.
As discussed in section II.A infra, this may not be true if the absolute size of
payments to executives negatively affects the productivity of other stakeholders in the
firm. Thus, poor employee morale or distrust of management may have adverse effects on
the value of the firm. Id.
107. See, e.g., Barry Gerhard & George T. Milkovich, Employee Compensation:
Research and Theory, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY 481, 508 (M.D. Dunnette & L.M. Hough eds., 1992) (summarizing studies).
108. Murphy, Top Executives, supra note 22, at 125-32. Executives receive only a small
fraction of the gains that they generate for shareholders when the firms they manage
perform well.
109. Jensen & Murphy, CEO Incentives, supra note 22, at 138-39.
110. These arguments rest on the presumptions that firms should be run in order to
maximize value and that compensation systems should be designed to incentivize
executives to achieve value maximization.
111. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2540.
112. Id. The Yermack and Brickley studies discussed below can be explained as
consistent with the agency cost reduction theory or alternatively with the claim that
executives seek to time the adoption of stock option programs and grants with the
announcement of favorable information that will boost stock prices. Id.
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stock option plans favorably, this justifies giving executives explicit
incentive pay." 3

Initially, empirical studies found that the stock market reacts
favorably to the adoption of incentive plans." 4 Examining the effect
of the announcement of long-term performance plans, Larcker
reported positive and significant abnormal returns at nineteen firms a
day after the SEC received the firm's proxy materials containing
these disclosures."5 Similarly, Brickley and his associates analyzed
the effects on shareholder wealth of the announcement of a number
of different executive compensation plans: stock options, stock
appreciation rights, restricted stock, phantom stock, and performance
plans."6

Although the abnormal returns during the two day

announcement period were not significantly different from zero,"'
cumulative returns over a period beginning at the board meeting date
and ending a day after the SEC "stamp date" were positive (2.4%)
and significant."' No differences were found in stock price reactions
across the different types of plans.'19
Tehranian and Waegelein, focusing on introductions of shortterm compensation plans, also found some evidence of positive
returns using a sample of forty-two firms' announcements between
1971 and 1980.120 Monthly average abnormal returns were positive
and significant the month before and the month of the

113. Note that this argument does not justify giving executives unlimited amounts of
explicit incentive pay. Increases in long-term incentive pay are justified only if the stock
market views them as increasing the value of the firm. Existing studies of the market's
reaction to company stock option plans can be viewed as sanctioning the adoption of
limited forms of incentive pay.
114. James Brickley et al., The Impact of Long-Range Managerial Compensation Plans
on Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. Acr. & ECON. 115, 128 (1985). A more recent study found
that stock prices increase even after the adoption of undisclosed grants of executive stock
options. David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News
Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449,454 (1997).
115. David F. Larcker, The Association Between Performance Plan Adoption and
Corporate Capital Investment, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 26 (1983). Firms in Larcker's
sample introduced performance plans between 1971 and 1978. Id. at 12.
116. Brickley, supra note 114, at 120. The data set included 175 proxies containing
proposals to introduce or make changes to compensation plans between 1979 and 1982.
Id. at 121.
117. Id. at 124.
118. Id. at 125. The "stamp date" refers to the date on which the SEC stamped the
filing as received at its offices.
119. Id. at 127.
120. Hassan Tehranian & James F. Waegelein, Market Reaction to Short-Term
Executive Compensation Plan Adoption, 7 J. Acr. & ECON. 131, 134-35 (1985).
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Cumulative returns were positive and significant
announcement.
for the six-month period prior to the announcement (19.51%) and the
ten-month period afterwards (10.5%). Returns between eleven and
twenty months afterward were not significantly different from zero.'22
These positive stock market reactions to the proposal of long-term
incentive compensation plans thus lead these economists to conclude
that incentive pay is value-increasing for the firm. However, this
study looked at bonus plans whose payouts depended on short-term
accounting measures and did not include a stock option component.
Two later studies specifically examined the adoption of stock
option plans alone. DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn found that the 107
firms adopting executive stock option plans in the 1978-82 period
exhibited a statistically significant average cumulative abnormal
return of +0.68%.123 For the fifty-three firms for which both board
meeting dates and SEC stamp dates are available, the average
cumulative abnormal return was +4.00%, which is also significantly
different from zero.
Morgan and Poulsen studied the stock market reaction to
proposals of stock option plans during the 1990s. 125 Using data for the
period 1992-95, they reported a significantly positive abnormal stock
price reaction for the proposal of executive stock option plans. 26 In
the three-day window surrounding the proxy mail date, the average
cumulative abnormal return for the 424 proposals in their sample is
+0.52%.127 Proposals for adoption of non-employee director plans
abnormal returns that are not
and employee plans are met with
128
zero.
from
different
significantly
In a more recent paper, Martin and Thomas examined a sample
of stock option proposals from the 1998 proxy season and stratified
the sample based on participant eligibility, measures of potential

121. Id. at 136. Positive and significant returns were found for four months, two
months, and one month prior to announcement, the month of announcement, and two and
ten months after announcement. Id. For some of these (e.g., two months prior and ten
months after), announcements of annual earnings may have confounded the results. Id. at
138-39.
122. Id. at 138.
123. Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on
Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 621 (1990).
124. Id.
125. Angela G. Morgan & Annette B. Poulsen, Linking Pay to PerformanceCompensation Proposals in the S&P 500, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 489, 504 (2001).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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129
dilution, plan features, type of plan, and industry classification.
They presented study results that indicated that the stock market
does not approve of highly dilutive stock option plans for
executives. " ' These proposals elicited a statistically significant -0.90%
average cumulative market adjusted return over the three-day period
surrounding the proxy filing date.'31 These results reflected recent
dramatic increases in potential dilution caused by the widespread use
of option plans and the dramatic increase in executive compensation
levels. They indicated that the market has become more aware of the
costs of stock option plans, and less impressed with their benefits.'32
The second set of arguments favoring stronger incentive pay
begin by noting that in leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") financed by
sophisticated firms, the owners of the now privately-held firm give
their managers large equity positions in the companies as a means of
incentivizing the managers to put forth their best efforts.'
These
executives are managing the same assets and resources more
successfully after the LBO than they were before the transaction, with
the only big difference being that they, have greater incentives after
receiving large equity shares.'
The size of these equity positions
dwarfs that provided by executive pay contracts at public
corporations. Economists arguing in favor of high levels of incentive
pay claim that the big efficiency gains generated by these LBOs are
the result of these high incentives and demonstrate that public
corporations are not providing their executives large enough option
grants.135
At public corporations, there is empirical evidence that executive
compensation is sensitive to firm performance. An early study by
Jensen and Murphy of the relationship between executive

129. THOMAS & MARTIN, supra note 7, at 51-58.
130. Id. at 73-74.
131. See id. at 75-81.
132. Id. at 73.
133. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 435.
134. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2542. Their pay packages are not the only significant
incentives however. The increased debt levels of the company and the greater level of
monitoring by the financial sponsors of the LBO may also contribute to any performance
improvements. Id.
135. For a survey of the various studies, see Murphy, supra note 8, at 2542-47. He
concludes that this evidence is only suggestive that companies can expect returns from
introducing performance-based compensation plans. Id. at 2547. A related argument is
made by Bill Gross in The New Math of Ownership, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at
68 (proposing that established businesses spin out promising ideas into new businesses
where all employees have significant equity stakes as a means of motivating them to put
forth their best efforts).
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compensation and corporate stock performance found that managers'
pay had a weak positive relationship to performance.' Using data
from 1969 to 1983, this study found that CEO compensation changed
only $3.25 for every $1,000 change in stock value. Most of this change
came from the change in the value of executives' stock ownership,
with only very small effects from changes in stock options and
salary/bonus compensation. Based on these results, Jensen and
Murphy claimed that executive pay was not sufficiently sensitive to
performance to adequately incentivize managers. They argued that
companies should greatly increase the use of restricted stock awards
in order to tie CEO wealth to stock value and thereby give executives
greater incentives to improve corporate performance.137
In a more recent study 38 using data from 1980 to 1994, Professors
Hall and Liebman found that CEO compensation, when defined to
include all changes in CEO wealth (direct pay plus changes in the
value of CEO stock and stock option holdings), was highly responsive
to company performance. 139 They found that the value of stock and
stock options held by CEOs were much more sensitive to changes in
the company's performance than were the salary and bonus
components of CEO compensation. Thus, for example, while the
median CEO in companies performing in the bottom tenth percentile
of a group of comparable companies lose $435,000 on their stock and
stock option plans, they can increase their wealth by $8.6 million if
their company's performance improves to the ninetieth percentile. 4 '
This gives the executive strong incentives to improve company
performance.

136. Jensen & Murphy, PerformancePay, supra note 22.
137. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 440.
138. Hall & Liebman, supra note 10, at 665-66.
139. Hall and Liebman's study was made, at least in part, in response to Jensen and
Murphy's paper. Hall and Liebman argue that Jensen and Murphy's study is outdated
because they were relying on data from 1969-1983, before stock options became a
common form of compensation. Id. at 655. They also point out that by only focusing on
the change in CEO wealth relative to the changes in the value of the firm, Jensen and
Murphy's study makes pay-performance sensitivity appear small because of the fact that
when large companies grow their value is often increased by billions of dollars and, as a
result, any increase in compensation that one man receives will pale in comparison. Id. at
656 (noting that focusing on the change in CEO wealth relative to the change in firm value
is misleading because the denominator, change in firm value, can be very large).
140. Id. at 682.
141. Id. at 685.
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Neither of these studies resolves the fundamental question of
how well executive incentives work.'42 Giving away more of the
company's profits to highly compensated executives is only
worthwhile if the resulting improvement in performance offsets the
costs of the awards. As noted before, this may not be the case with
mega-grants of stock options.'43 One study of a small number of
companies has found that total returns to shareholders of many

companies with large
stock option programs trail the performance of
44
the S&P 500 index.'
A more comprehensive study by Habib and Ljungqvist found
that firms with higher levels of CEO stock ownership have higher
Tobin's Q's.145 They believe that this supports the hypothesis that
CEO's maximize firm value when they are the residual claimants in a
company. 46 Yet, they further concluded that CEOs hold too many
stock options, and that the marginal benefit of these excess options is
less than the cost to shareholders.1 47 With the exception of this study,
however, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on this issue. 48
Psychologists almost universally agree that human performance
improves with increasing incentives. 49 The proposition that needs to
be tested is to what extent do changes in incentives lead to

improvements in subsequent performance."" One study of thousands
142. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 441. There is a third line of research that
examines the relationship between managerial stockholdings and company performance
indirectly. These studies use Tobin's Q-Ratio, the market value of the firm divided by the
replacement cost of its assets, as a measure of company performance. See Murphy, supra
note 8, at 2541. These studies, summarized by Murphy, have produced mixed results. Id.
143. A mega-grant of stock options is an award that is initially valued at more than $10
million. Rachel Emma Silverman, The Going Rate: Mega Options, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
1999, at B18.
144. Joann S. Lublin & Leslie Scism, Stock Options at Firms Irk Some Investors, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at B1 (reporting on study by Jack Ciesielski of the Analyst
Accounting Observer).
145. Michel A. Habib & Alexander P. Ljungqvist, Firm Value and Managerial
Incentives (unpublished working paper, 2000).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Murphy, supra note 8, at 2542-47.
149. See, e.g., J. Stacy Adams & Patricia R. Jacobsen, Effects of Wage Inequities on
Work Quality, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 19, 19 (1964).
150. One of the fundamental problems of psychophysics is discovering simple equations
that describe how the intensity of stimuli are related to people's impressions. GEORGE A.
GESCHEIDER, PSYCHOPHYSICS:
METHOD, THEORY AND APPLICATION 215 (2d ed.
1985). One of the first attempts to formulate such a law was undertaken by Daniel
Bernoulli in 1738. Id. Bernoulli studied the way in which people value money. Id. He
proposed that the utility of money increases at a decreasing rate as the amount of money
that a person has grows. Id. He proposed that this relationship was described by a
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of executives at 250 large American corporations found that raising
the sensitivity of changes in salaries and bonuses to current corporate
performance has a positive and statistically significant effect on future
performance.'5 1 The same study found similar correlations between
increases in pay sensitivity to current rates of return to shareholders
and resultant increases in shareholder return in the next year.
However, this study did not examine the effects of long-term
incentive pay plans. No other studies have been conducted on this
question.
Risk may also play an important role in determining whether
offering executives large amounts of incentive pay leads to improved
firm performance. Higher levels of incentive pay by firms facing
significant business risks may lead executives to withhold their efforts
or take actions to reduce their risk exposure, thereby hurting firm
performance.'
A recent study by Bloom and Milkovich found that
for firms facing riskier business environments, the "greater use of
incentive pay may be associated with lower firm performance."'53
They concluded that higher risk firms should increase base pay levels
and reduce incentive pay."'
More research needs to be done to demonstrate that long-term
incentive pay plans create net benefits for corporations. The role of
risk and how its effects vary across companies also needs to be better
understood. Given the substantial costs of incentive pay plans, and
their uncertain benefits, corporate boards of directors should
investigate these questions carefully before authorizing mega-grants
of stock options.
In the interim, directors should give fresh consideration to using
restricted stock as an alternative to stock options. Restricted stock
awards have the virtue of giving executives exactly the same
incentives as all shareholders because they give executives exactly the
same instrument as other shareholders: stock. If the restrictions on
logarithmic function. Id. More recent experiments have shown that the actual
relationship is a power function where money's utility increases as a function of its amount
raised to the .45 power approximately. Id.
151. MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16, at 442 (citing John M. Abowd, Does
Performance-BasedManagerial Compensation Affect CorporatePerformance?, 43 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 52S, 52S-73S (1990)); Murphy, supra note 8, at 2539 (also citing the
Abowd study).
152. Matthew C. Bloom & George T. Milkovich, The Relationship Between Risk,
Incentive Pay, and Organizational Performance, ACAD. MGMT. J. (forthcoming)
(manuscript on file with author).
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id. at 22.
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the shares are sufficiently long term, then this would eliminate many
of the distortions discussed above because managers would have to
hold their shares for the long-term.

III. Should Boards Consider the Costs of
Internal Pay Differentials?

Directors need to be better informed about the value of pay-forperformance compensation systems. The duty of care requires
boards to have a reasonable basis for concluding that large incentive
pay awards are beneficial to the firm.'
The Delaware Supreme
Court has stated that directors must consider all material information
about executive compensation agreements that is reasonably
available to them in order to satisfy their duty of care.'56
To satisfy this fiduciary duty, directors should determine whether

the costs of issuing mega-grants of stock options, or other forms of
incentive

compensation,

are

outweighed

by

any

resulting

improvements to corporate performance. Boards could either make
this decision relying on advice from internal corporate employees or
outside experts.157 However, they would need a reasonable basis for
155. The duty of care requires boards to be reasonably informed about whether their
actions are in the best interests of the corporation. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
873 (Del. 1985); see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971
(Del. Ch. 1996) (applying duty of care analysis in dicta to find board may have duty to
implement internal monitoring systems in certain areas).
156. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000). In that case, the Court found that
information relating to large payouts under a severance contract was material information
that was reasonably available to a board of directors where their compensation consultant
could have calculated these amounts and did not do so. Id. at 259-60. For an extensive
discussion of the implications of this decision for the standards of judicial review of
executive compensation decisions, see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating
Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 596-99
(2001).
157. If the compensation committee directors did not have the necessary expertise to
make this decision themselves they would need to seek expert advice about it. Van
Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 876-77 (concluding that directors must be informed about the value
of the corporation when they make decision to sell the company; they may obtain this
information through the use of outside experts or internal personnel, provided that they
have a reasonable basis to conclude that the experts are qualified to provide this advice).
In some circumstances, compensation consultants might be able to provide this
expertise. Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive
Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1877-81 (1992) (book review) (noting that compensation
experts are qualified to compare executive compensation in similar companies and to give
boards advice about appropriate compensation levels). However, given the complete lack
of research in the area, compensation consultants would not be able to tell a board
whether incentive pay packages with substantial option components were cost-justified
from shareholders' perspective.
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concluding that any expert was qualified to give an opinion on the
matter. Given our current state of ignorance about the value of stock
option plans, this requirement would certainly make directors more
careful about awarding mega-grants of stock options to executives. It
would also provide stimulus for further research on this critical
question."'
When challenged, boards generally point to the opinions of their
compensation consultants that their executive compensation packages
are appropriate. "9 These consultants are normally well-informed
about the relative pay practices of the firm within its industrial sector.
They will have access to highly-detailed studies of the executive pay
systems employed by comparable firms that compete with the firm
they are advising. Although this information may be very useful in
determining the opportunity costs of management, it does not address
the key question before the board:
what level of executive
compensation will maximize the value of the firm?' 6° Without this
information, directors cannot claim to be making informed
determinations about the impact of executive pay levels on their firms
and shareholders.
Institutional investors and other large shareholders will need to
force boards to face these tough questions. They should demand that
directors justify executive pay packages as value maximizing for the
firm. These stakeholders have the power to insist on an accounting of
the costs of greater degrees of pay dispersion. This could include
estimates of the increased level of employee turnover, decreased
morale, and losses in worker productivity. They can also push boards
to quantify the incentive benefits of pay-for-performance
compensation packages so that these can be weighed against their
dilutive impact on shareholders' equity and voting rights.

158. Numerous authors have noted the near complete absence of any empirical
research on the net value to shareholders of incentive compensation awards to executives.
See, e.g., MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 16; Murphy, supra note 8.
159. In re Walt Disney Co. Shareholders Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361-62 (Del.
Ch. 1998).
160. Even if boards ignore the effects of their decisions on non-shareholder
constituencies, this remains an important question because it affects the company's stock
price. In a related development, the Airline Pilots Association is seeking shareholder
support for a proposal that asks the directors of Delta Airlines to measure employee
satisfaction in calculating top executives' performance awards. Joann S. Lublin, The
Going Rate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1999, at B18. UAL Corp., the parent company of
United Airlines, has already accepted a similar request and will tie senior management's
bonuses partly to employee happiness. Id.
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Shareholders should also ask the board to justify the cost of
incentive pay packages awarded to management. Giving executives
options to buy ten percent of the company's stock is not costless to
investors, despite the accounting treatment for stock options.'

If

these options raise the value of the firm by incentivizing managers to
work harder, stakeholders should ask boards to provide evidence to
support this claim.
The duty of care should require directors to be informed about
the effect of internal pay differentials on firm value. Boards need to
consider the negative consequences for the firm as a whole if one
group is perceived as being unfairly rewarded. Directors also need to
determine if high executive pay adversely affects other workers'
productivity, turnover, and ultimately if these factors adversely
impact the value of the firm. The board should know at what level of
compensation these effects begin and if they increase at higher levels.
There has been almost no research on these questions. However, the
studies discussed above point toward placing a ceiling on executive
compensation because of these effects.
Conclusion
The Enron disaster has had many negative impacts on our
country, but it has stimulated a reappraisal of executive pay practices
in the United States. Corporate directors should care about internal
corporate pay inequalities because they may directly affect the value
of their firms. They should also consider whether large stock option
grants are a value-increasing form of compensation; using restricted
stock awards may have more beneficial effects at the same cost to the
company.
The impact of internal pay differentials and stock options on firm
value are important pieces of material information that boards should
have before them when making decisions about the appropriate levels
of executive pay. A director's fiduciary duty of care should require
her to consider such material information before awarding hundreds
of millions of dollars of shareholder money to corporate officers. To
date, boards have been ill-informed on these questions.
Researchers need to study these effects, too. Little work has
been done on the net benefits of stock option awards. Long-term
studies of the impact of incentive compensation need to be conducted

161. Calvin H. Johnson, Stealing the Company with Free Stock Options: The Furor over
Accounting Standards,65 TAx NOTES 355, 356 (1994).
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in order to quantify the benefits of stock option plans. Similarly,
more research needs to be conducted on the effects of internal pay
differentials on firm value. Such research would be most useful to
directors if it could establish some guidelines for appropriate pay
differentials at different types of companies. Without further work
on these issues, corporate boards will continue to make uninformed
and very expensive guesses about how to pay their executives.
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